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A

DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX
(By J. W. KELLEY of the Denver Bar)
TRIFLE in contemplation of law must be something

extremely small. Nearly every famous legal decision
rests upon a comparatively insignificant base. In the
Dartmouth College case the matter in dispute was the right
to replevin a corporation seal and minute book. In Marbury
vs. Madison, the litigation arose over the certificate of appointment of a justice of the peace which was functus officio
at the time of the decision, the term of the appointment having expired, The Dred Scott case turned upon a demurrer to
the jurisdiction, the historic part of the decision being merely
dicta. It appears that in the higher brackets of judicature the
more trivial the subject-matter of the suit the more far-reaching the effect of the decision.
For support of the above syllabus see infra.
In 1860 in the State of Kentucky, a Mrs. Hepburn gave
her note for $11,250, to one Griswold, due in two years.
When the note matured it was put in judgment and Mrs.
Hepburn tendered in payment treasury notes of the United
States. Congress, while the note was maturing, had passed,
in the exigent crisis of Civil War, an act providing that paper
money, not supported by coin in the treasury, was legal
tender for all purposes.
Salmon P. Chase was secretary of the United States
Treasury at the time the overwhelming necessity of the war
situation caused congress to issue the paper dollars and no one
was so insistent upon that act as he. When Hepburn vs. Griswold* was argued in the United States Supreme Court, Salmon P. Chase was Chief Justice. Chase the Chief Justice did
not agree with Chase the cabinet officer and he wrote an opinion concurred in by four of the other seven justices holding
that congress under its grant of power to "coin money and
regulate the value thereof," could not make Griswold accept
anything but gold or silver in payment for his judgment.
When this decision was rendered in 1870 the parity of
the legal tender notes with gold had been so nearly restored
that the amount in dispute was extremely small. Mr. Justice
*8 Wall. 603.
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Miller rendered an opinion opposite from that of the Chief
Justice and was supported therein by Justices Swayne and
Davis.
Two years went by.
Meanwhile a Mrs. Lee secured a judgment against one
Knox in Texas for $7,376. The right of Knox to discharge
his obligation in the same kind of money that Mrs. Hepburn
had tendered to Griswold was passed on by the United States
Supreme Court in January, 1872. At that time the premium
of gold over the United States legal tender notes, in spite of
the decision in Hepburn vs. Griswold, was so small as to be
negligible.
Since Chief Justice Chase wrote the opinion in Hepburn
vs. Griswold, Mr. Justice Grier had resigned and Mr. Justice
Strong and Mr. Justice Bradley were added to the court, by
appointment by President Grant under an act of congress
increasing the number of judges to nine. The object of this
increase seemed to be to prevent all the justices being wrong
at the same time. The entire question of the power of congress to issue paper promises and give them a legal tender character was then re-examined pursuant, it was claimed, to the
high behest of the demands of justice. The two new justices
took the view of the legal tender notes held by Justices Miller,
Swayne and Davis, and the former decision of the Chief Justice and Justices Clifford, Field and Nelson was reversed.
Chief Justice Chase's opinion was based upon the fact
that making the notes legal tender gave them no additional
value, hence to give them that character was not of such absolute necessity as he had supposed in 1862.* He held that the
legal tender notes were not money in the sense the constitution
conferred on congress the right to coin the same; and also
that their issue impaired the obligation of existing contracts
and depi'ived persons of their property without due process
of law.
Mr. Justice Strong who wrote the reversing opinion held
that congress alone was the judge of whether the war time
necessity had existed and its conclusion could not be disturbed
by the court. He pointed out that the absence of direct au*$1,250,000.000 in legal tender currency was issued when war expenses exceeded
$2,000,000 a day.
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thority in the constitution to make the notes legal tender did
not prove a lack of such power; that there was, for example,
no authority in the constitution to punish crime, except counterfeiting and treason; that the Federal Bankruptcy Act directly impaired the obligation of contracts which power was
not prohibited to congress by the constitution but to the
states; that the government could not be carried on, the tariff
revised, or war declared without greatly affecting the value of
property without process of law. Both opinions drew freely
on the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall, seeming to find
there, as in the Scriptures, material which anyone might quote
to his purpose.
Much of what appears in the opinions in the Legal
Tender Cases* is pertinent to the present attempt of congress
to create a delicatessen dollar as it is termed by the President's
chief party rival. They also contain arguments for and
against relaxing the restraint of the constitution in case of
what appears to be necessity in peace time. The fact that
Chief Justice Chase was cordially receptive to the presidential
nomination in 1872 or that Justices Strong and Bradley were
disposed to give aid and comfort to his enemies could, of
course, have nothing to do with the soundness of the arguments used.
The interesting fact is that all the lucubrations of the
learned judges did not seem to greatly affect the value of the
treasury promises. When they were legal tender they sank to
$2.85 in paper to $1.00 in gold; after Chief Justice Chase's
opinion deprived them of their legal tender quality they steadily rose to a practical parity with the precious metal. While
the constitutional questions were being settled, Mesdames
Hepburn and Lee probably compromised with their adversaries concerning the insignificant percentage at issue and were
doubtless greatly astonished to see such prodigious judicial
oaks grown from such small acorns.
The importance of decisions on constitutional questions
seem to be in inverse proportion to their subject matter.
Doubtless it is such trifles of which the law, in the sense of
the Latin maxim, is so oblivious.
*12 Wall. 457.

